Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name:  Barbara Hanel
Author-X-Name-First: Barbara
Author-X-Name-Last: Hanel

Author-Name:  Regina Riphahn
Author-X-Name-First: Regina
Author-X-Name-Last: Riphahn

Title: Financial Incentives and the Timing of Retirement: Evidence from Switzerland
Abstract: We use reforms in the Swiss public retirement system to identify the responsiveness of
retirement timing to financial incentives. A permanent reduction of retirement benefits by 3.4
percent induces more than 70 percent of females to postpone their retirement. The
responsiveness of male workers, who undergo a different treatment, is lower.
Length:  9 pages
Creation-Date:  2006-12
File-URL: http://www.bgpe.de/texte/DP/009_hanel_riphahn.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
File-Function: First version, 2006
Number: 009
Classification-JEL: J26, H55, J14
Keywords: retirement insurance, incentives, social security, labor force exit,
natural experiment, Switzerland
Handle: RePEc:bav:wpaper:009_hanel_riphahn